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Abstract
We study the role of exchange rate variability in the ￿rm￿ s choice of whether
to o⁄er one or two varieties. We show that variability induces the ￿rm to verti-
cally segment markets (o⁄er two varieties). This happens because variability in
the exchange rate a⁄ects income dispersion and hence the ￿rm￿ s incentives to
extract consumer surplus. To better extract surplus, the ￿rm o⁄ers two price-
quality menus, a high quality variant geared for top-end surplus extraction and
a low quality variant to address market coverage concerns.
Keywords: exchange rate variability, income dispersion, surplus extraction,
product variety
JEL Classi￿cation: F23, L12
1 Introduction
For ￿rms selling across national borders, the exchange rate is an important factor in
strategic planning and behaviour. Fluctuations in the exchange rate have a bearing
on exporting ￿rms￿competitiveness and hence pro￿tability. Baldwin and Krugman
(1989) show that the level of the exchange rate matters for the ￿rm￿ s incentives to
enter/ exit a foreign market.
Although there exists a large literature on ￿rm behaviour under variable ex-
change rates (Dornbusch, 1987; Bodnar et al. 2002; Friberg, 1999; 2001) to name
but a few, no study (to my knowledge) has considered the e⁄ect of exchange rate
variability on ￿rms￿product variety. Yet, one of the important aspects of ￿rm strat-
egy concerns the number of varieties (product mix). According to the Economist
(November 2001), the launch of the Euro has seen some ￿rms in Europe cutting on
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1the number of varieties they produce. The launch of the Euro meant a permanent
reduction in exchange rate variability to zero within the EMU. The question we
address in this paper is the following: Does exchange rate variability matter for a
￿rm￿ s choice of the number of varieties to produce?
In many cases, ￿rms o⁄er multiple varieties of the same product. These vari-
eties may be di⁄erentiated by quality, size or other subtle characteristics. A simple
example is that of a bookseller, who can sell the book as a paperback, hardcover or
both. A more elaborate example is that of a car manufacturer, for example, BMW.
There is the 1 series, 3 series the 5 and 7 series respectively. Moreover, within each
series, there are several di⁄erent varieties ￿di⁄erentiated by such things as engine
capacity, leather upholstery, entertainment etc. In such circumstances, ￿rms may
not necessarily exit a foreign market when the exchange rate dips too low as Baldwin
and Krugman (1989) purports. Rather, the ￿rm may just alter its product range.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the e⁄ects of
exchange rate variability (or lack of) on product variety. We consider a monopoly
￿rm selling in the Home market and the Foreign market. Consumers in both markets
are uniformly distributed according to willingness to pay for quality. The ￿rm cannot
perfectly price discriminate. We assume that the Law of One Price (LOP) holds.
The monopolist￿ s problem is to choose whether to produce a single variety or two
varieties.
We ￿nd that exchange rate variability engenders product variety. This is due
to the fact that changes in the exchange rate not only a⁄ect the purchasing power
of consumers, they also a⁄ect income dispersion and hence the ￿rm￿ s incentives to
extract consumer surplus. Higher income dispersion makes it harder for the ￿rm to
extract surplus with a single variety. A single variety forces the ￿rm to price out too
many consumers but at the same time fails to extract much surplus from the top
end of the market. Clearly, market coverage and surplus extraction are incompatible
when the ￿rm o⁄ers a single variety. Hence variability in the exchange rate induces
the ￿rm to choose the two varieties strategy (i.e., vertically segment markets). This
is a classic case of second degree price discrimination ￿but here driven by exchange
rate volatility.
Close in scope to the present study is Friberg (2001), who studies how variability
in the exchange rate a⁄ects a monopoly ￿rm￿ s incentives to "horizontally" segment
international markets. Other related literature include Gabszewicz et al. (1986) who
study a monopoly ￿rm￿ s optimal product mix when the feasible range of qualities is
bounded and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed, (2001) who study a monopoly ￿rm￿ s
incentives to vertically segment markets when consumers are distributed according
to intensity of preference rather than willingness to pay.
2The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out and analyzes the model.
Results are stated and discussed in section 3 and section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Model and Preliminaries
Our model is closely related to Lambertini (2000). Consider a monopoly ￿rm selling
in Home (H) and Foreign (F) markets. The ￿rm can choose from two mutually ex-
clusive technologies ￿a "monovariety" technology that allows it to produce a good
of quality q only and a "multivariety" technology that allows it to produce two qual-
ities; a high quality, q2 and a low quality, q1: If the ￿rm chooses the multivariety
technology, it has to sell both varieties in each market and moreover, it has to pay
an additional ￿xed cost K > 0 over and above that associated with the monovariety
technology. Thus, K can be interpreted as the cost of vertically segmenting mar-
kets. For simplicity, we normalize the ￿xed cost associated with the monovariety
technology to zero. Quality is chosen from the interval (0;1): Total production cost
for any variety q‘ is ￿‘ = tq2
‘x‘; t > 0 is a constant and x‘ is the output of variety
‘: Thus marginal cost of producing a unit of variety q‘ is c‘ (q‘) = tq2
‘. Observe
that, for a given quality level, the marginal cost of output is constant whereas the
marginal cost of quality is increasing.
Consumers in each country are uniformly distributed on [￿￿;￿￿]; ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1 > 0;
where ￿ denotes the marginal willingness to pay for quality and ￿ is a constant
measuring the level of a› uence. We assume (throughout the paper) that ￿ ￿ 1 for
Home consumers and ￿ ￿ 1 for Foreign consumers. That is, the Foreign consumers
are at least as well o⁄ as the Home consumers. Consumers have unit demands. A
generic consumer￿ s net utility takes the form;
U (￿) =
(
￿￿qi ￿ Pij;i 2 f1;2g;j 2 fH;Fg
0 otherwise
: (1)
where Pij is the price of quality i in country j.
Let S be the the exchange rate ￿the units of Home currency needed to buy one
unit of Foreign currency. We make the following assumptions
Assumptions A1: (i). ￿ ￿ 8
5 and (ii). S 2 [0:72;1:28]:
The ￿rst assumption ensures that the market is only partially covered and the
second assumption ensures that demands are nonnegative when the ￿rm sells both
varieties in each market1. We further assume that the exchange rate is symmetrically
1For the derivation of the upper bound to ￿; see Appendix A.
3distributed with a mean of unit and a ￿nite variance, ￿2. We also assume that LOP
holds, that is, PiH = SPiF.
In the monovariety case, a consumer with willingness to pay ￿ gets surplus ￿￿q￿
Pj if she buys a unit of the good with quality q and 0 otherwise. Let b ￿ denote
the consumer for whom the individual rationality constraint just binds. Then, b ￿ =
Pj=￿q: Thus, in each market, j; the ￿rm faces the demand:
xj = ￿ ￿ Pj=￿q;j = H;F: (2)
In the multivariety case, a consumer with willingness to pay ￿ gets surplus ￿￿q2￿
P2j when buying quality q2 and surplus ￿￿q1￿P1j when buying quality q1 and surplus
zero when not buying. The consumer buys quality q2 rather than quality q1 only
if ￿￿q2 ￿ P2j ￿ ￿￿q1 ￿ P1j: Let b ￿2 denote the consumer indi⁄erent between buying
qualities q2 and q1: Then, b ￿2 = (P2j ￿ P1j)=￿ (q2 ￿ q1) and all consumers with ￿ > b ￿2
buy quality q2. Consumers with ￿ < b ￿2 either buy quality q1 or do not buy at all.
They buy q1 if and only if ￿￿q1 ￿ P1j ￿ 0: Thus, in each country, j; the ￿rm faces
















The ￿rm maximizes expected pro￿ts. The uncertainty arises from the fact that the
level of the exchange rate will only be known after some irrevocable decisions have
already been taken. We model the ￿rm￿ s decision as a two stage game. In the
￿rst stage and before the realization of the exchange rate, the ￿rm decides on the
quality level(s) q (q1 and q2). To simplify our analysis, we suppose that the choice of
quality is made assuming that the exchange rate equal its expected value of unity2.
Thereafter, the exchange rate is revealed and the ￿rm makes a second move, the
choice of price(s).3 We solve the problem backwards, starting with the second stage
decision.
Let n 2 f1;2g be the number of varieties o⁄ered by the ￿rm and ￿k; k = I;II
be the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t when it o⁄ers k varieties. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are denominated
2In an appendix available from the author on request, we discard this assumption and instead
let the ￿rm choose the optimal quality (ex ante), given the distribution of the exchange rate. The
conclusions of the paper are qualitatively una⁄ected but the expressions quickly get messy.
3This assumption implies that prices are perfectly ￿ exible. An alternative and perhaps more
realistic assumption would be that both prices and qualities are chosen before the exchange rate in
known. This however, complicates the model greatly.
4in the Home currency, that is, Foreign earned pro￿ts have to be converted into the
Home currency equivalent. Given the qualities chosen in the ￿rst stage, the ￿rm￿ s

















s.t. PiH = SPiF: (4)
Substituting the demand functions in (2) and (3) into the objective function, (4),
and di⁄erentiating with respect to prices gives the equilibrium prices as a function of
the quality levels (we do not report these here). Substituting the equilibrium prices
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3 (1 + S￿)
￿ K (11)
when the ￿rm o⁄ers two distinct varieties (n = 2).
We see from (6) ￿(11) that qualities, prices and pro￿ts are increasing in market
a› uence (￿;￿) but decreasing in the cost of quality, t. Notice also that a depreciation
of the Home currency (increase in S) raises the Home price, PH; but lowers the
Foreign price, PF and an appreciation ( decrease in S) has the opposite e⁄ect.
4Since the calculations are not of any particular interest here, we relegate all calculations to
Appendix B.
5Thus, a depreciation is tantamount to an increase (decrease) in the wealth of Foreign
(Home) consumers and the opposite is true for an appreciation.
From (6), q￿ = 2￿￿=3t(1 + ￿) and from (9), q￿
1 = 2￿￿=5t(1 + ￿) and q￿
2 =
4￿￿=5t(1 + ￿): Comparing q￿ and q￿
1 on the one hand and q￿ and q￿
2 on the other
gives q￿ ￿ q￿
1 = 4￿￿=15t(1 + ￿) = 2[q￿
2 ￿ q￿] > 0: Hence,
Lemma 1 When consumers are uniformly distributed according willingness to pay
for quality, and the marginal cost of quality is increasing, a single variety ￿rm
produces a good of intermediate quality compared to a multivariety ￿rm. That
is, q￿
1 < q￿ < q￿
2.
This observation is new5 and it contrasts sharply with the ￿ndings of Gabszewicz
et al. (1986) and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2001) that a single product
monopolist pools all consumers on the top quality. The objective of the ￿rm is to
extract as much consumer surplus as possible. Observe that under our assumptions,
price is convex in the quality level (see equation B2 in appendix B). Consequently,
top end surplus extraction calls for a high quality whereas greater market coverage
calls for a low quality (and hence low price). When the ￿rm o⁄ers a single variety,
this poses a dilemma. Greater market coverage can only be achieved at the expense
of top-end surplus extraction and vice-versa. To minimize incongruence, the ￿rm
settles for an intermediate quality ￿ a compromise that permits modest surplus
extraction without pricing out too many consumers6. When the ￿rm o⁄ers two
qualities, the tension alluded to above falls away. The ￿rm tailors the high quality
variety for surplus extraction and the low quality variety for market coverage. Thus,
q1 is much lower and q2 is much higher.
The tension alluded to above is absent in the models of Gabszewicz et al. (1986)
and Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2001). In their models, quality is costless
and moreover, markets are always fully covered. For these reasons, bunching occurs
on the top quality. In the present model, however, the marginal cost of quality
depends on the quality level. As the quality level increases, so does the price and as
a result, lower willingness to pay consumers are driven out of the market. The need
to balance surplus extraction and market coverage implies that bunching occurs on
an intermediate quality.
5Although Lambertini (2000) employs a similar model to the one of this paper, he does not
compare the qualities across the single and the multivariety strategies. Instead, he contrasts the
monopoly outcome to the social planner outcome.
6The degree of market coverage matters here for two reasons. First, the di⁄erence in willingness
to pay between the poorest and the richest individuals is not huge (￿ = ￿ ￿ 1) and second, the
market is relatively poor (￿ ￿
8
5).
6Below we consider the relationship between pro￿ts and the exchange rate. Figure
1 below plots ￿I and ￿II for ￿ = 1, K = 0 and ￿
3
=t = 1:7







Figure 1: Pro￿t as a Function of the Exchange Rate, S:
There are two interesting things to note about Figure 1. First, ￿I and ￿II are
concave in the exchange rate and second, ￿I appears more concave than ￿II and
they diverge as the Home currency depreciates.
Concavity of the pro￿t function in the exchange rate, means that the ￿rm loses
more in bad times (appreciations) than it gains in good times (depreciations). Hence,
greater variability in the exchange rate leads to lower expected pro￿ts.
A depreciation of the Home currency lowers Home market pro￿ts but raises
pro￿ts from the Foreign market (denominated in foreign currency) at a decreasing
rate8. Because now Foreign pro￿ts are converted at a more favourable exchange rate,
the Home currency equivalent of the Foreign pro￿ts increases with the exchange rate
and this more than makes up for the fall in Home market pro￿ts. This gives a concave
shape to the pro￿t function.
What is most striking about Figure 1 is the observation that ￿I is more concave
than ￿II. This means that exchange rate variability hurts the ￿rm more if it o⁄ers
a single variety. O⁄ering two varieties allows the ￿rm to reduce the sensitivity of
pro￿ts to exchange rate surprises (i.e., it makes the pro￿t function less concave).
Hence, one may conjecture that greater variability in the exchange rate may induce
the ￿rm to choose a multivariety strategy. In the next section, we show that this is
7Since ￿
3
=t enters multiplicatively in the pro￿t functions, it does not a⁄ect the curvature of the
pro￿t functions. Hence we can, without loss of generality, assume that ￿
3
=t = 1:
8Pro￿t in the Foreign market increases at a decreasing rate because the LOP imposes a much
tighter restriction as the Home currency depreciates.
7indeed the case.
3 Variability and the Number of Varieties
Let 4￿ ￿ ￿II ￿ ￿I denote the pro￿t di⁄erence ￿the di⁄erence between the pro￿t
with two varieties and the pro￿t with a single variety (i.e., the bene￿t to the ￿rm
from vertically segmenting markets when LOP holds). We study the relationship
between the pro￿t di⁄erence and the exchange rate. In subsection 3.1, we consider
the case where the Home and Foreign markets are equally a› uent. In subsection
3.2 we relax the symmetry assumption and subsection 3.3 assesses the quantitative
signi￿cance of our main result.






29 ￿ (66 + 8￿)S +
￿
45 + 24￿ + 8￿2￿
S2￿
2￿2
675S (1 + ￿)
3 (1 + S￿)
￿ K: (12)
3.1 Symmetric markets (￿ = 1)
When markets are equally a› uent (￿ = 1), (12) reduces to:
4￿ (S) = ￿
￿
77S2 ￿ 74S + 29
￿
=S (1 + S); ￿ = ￿
3
=2700t: Let S = 1:19: Indepen-
dent of ￿ and t; 4￿ (S) is convex for S ￿ S.9 Since S is symmetrically distributed
with mean of unit, we restrict ourselves (in this section) to the symmetric interval
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Figure 2: Pro￿t di⁄erence as a function of exchange rate, S
for ￿=8
5;t = :5;K = 0:





pro￿t di⁄erence is convex in S. That is, the expected pro￿t di⁄erence is increasing
in exchange rate volatility. Suppose we choose K ￿the cost of vertically segmenting
markets ￿ so that the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between the single and the two variety
strategies when the exchange rate is equal to unity: That is, K￿ solves the equation:
4￿ (1) ￿ ￿II(1) ￿ ￿I(1) = 0. Then we have;
Proposition 1 A ￿rm that is indi⁄erent between o⁄ering a single variety and two
varieties when the exchange rate is ￿xed and equal to its mean (of unity) strictly
prefers to o⁄er two varieties when the exchange rate is mildly stochastic.





exchange rate is symmetrically distributed, it follows that ES [4￿ (S)] > 4￿ (1) = 0.
Hence the ￿rm o⁄ers two varieties.
The intuition rests on the interaction between the following two observations;
viz, that exchange rate variability has wealth e⁄ects and that a single variety makes
surplus extraction more di¢ cult (Lemma 1). Exchange rate variability a⁄ects the
purchasing power of consumers, but more importantly here, it a⁄ects income dis-
persion10. It is this e⁄ect (e⁄ect on income dispersion) that matters for the ￿rm￿ s
choice of product range (see, for example, Gabszewicz et al. 1986). For example, a
10In our model, consumers have unit demands, so an increase in income will not translate into a
corresponding increase in demand by an individual consumer.
9depreciation makes the Foreign market richer but also generates greater dispersion
in willingness to pay. This confronts the ￿rm with a dilemma: On the one hand,
as the Foreign market gets richer, the ￿rm ￿nds it more costly to price out many
consumers (by charging a higher price). On the other hand, the higher spread in
willingness to pay creates incentives for the ￿rm to want to charge a higher price so
as to extract more surplus from the top end of the market. To resolve this dilemma,
the ￿rm needs to o⁄er both high and low quality varieties. This raises pro￿ts by
enhancing surplus extraction at the top and at the same time permitting greater
market coverage11.
With increasing marginal cost of quality, it is possible that the unit margin is
lower for the high quality variety compared to the intermediate variety (Srinagesh
and Bradburd, 1989; p. 103). However, this is not the case in the present model.
In fact, it can be shown that for all S in [0:72;1:28], the unit margin is higher for
quality q2 compared to quality q and higher for quality q compared to quality q1: This
discrepancy in the ability to extract net surplus ensures that, when the exchange
rate is stochastic, second degree price discrimination is more pro￿table than selling
a single variety to all consumers.
The ability to extract surplus is however curtailed by arbitrage concerns. A
"strong" depreciation of the Home currency implies a signi￿cant reduction in Foreign
prices and this weakens surplus extraction in the Foreign market. However, the
conversion e⁄ect ￿the e⁄ect of the level of the exchange rate on Foreign earned
pro￿ts expressed in terms of the Home currency ￿mitigates this diminished ability
to extract surplus by converting Foreign pro￿ts at a more favourable rate. It is the
interplay between the conversion e⁄ect and the LOP that determines the curvature
of the pro￿t di⁄erence. The stronger the depreciation, the more LOP binds and the
less convex the pro￿t di⁄erence becomes.
The above Proposition parallels Friberg (2001) ￿exchange rate volatility a⁄ects
consumers￿purchasing power and hence the ￿rm￿ s incentives to price discriminate.
In Friberg (2001), the ￿rm responds to exchange rate variability by horizontally
segmenting markets in order to third degree price discriminate. Here, we allow for
spatial arbitrage and the ￿rm responds to exchange rate variability by vertically
segmenting markets in order to second degree price discriminate.
We have shown that exchange rate variability matters for ￿rms￿decisions on
the number of varieties to produce. We ￿nd some support, albeit anecdotal, for
our ￿nding. The Economist (November, 2001) discusses how multiproduct ￿rms
selling in the EU are responding to the launch of the Euro. The introduction of the
11Gabszewicz (1983) show that there are instances where a larger heterogeneity in willingness to
pay may lead to fewer (and not more) varieties being o⁄ered by a monopolist.
10Euro meant a permanent reduction of exchange rate variability to zero within the
EMU. According to the Economist, some ￿rms, for example, Unilever and Procter
& Gamble have started trimming the number of brands they o⁄er so that they can
concentrate on a few brands while others, for example, Nestle, Henkel and Danone
are increasingly using the same brand name on their products across Euroland.
These observed responses are in line with the predictions of our model. Elimination
of exchange rate variability diminishes product variety because it reduces (expected)
future dispersion in income and hence the incentive to crowd the product space12.
3.2 Asymmetric markets13
In this subsection, we assume that the Foreign market is richer14, that is, ￿ > 1:
Figure 3 plots 4￿ (S;￿) for di⁄erent values of ￿:









Figure 3: Pro￿t di⁄erence as a function of the exchange rate, S: ￿=8
5;
t = 0:5; K = 0
Two things are immediate from Figure 3. First, the pro￿t di⁄erence, 4￿ (S;￿); is
increasing in ￿ (i.e., an increase in a› uence raises the pro￿tability of the multivariety
strategy) and (ii) the pro￿t di⁄erence becomes less convex as the Foreign market
gets richer.
When the Foreign market gets richer, the ￿rm responds by raising the qual-
ity level and this allows the ￿rm to charge higher prices. When the ￿rm sells two
12Prior to the formation of the EMU, the now EMU countries were characterized by semi-￿xed
exchange rates (mild volatility). That is, exchange rate variability between the currencies of the
now EMU member countries was rather low compared to variability with non EMU countries.
13The analysis here is only exploratory and therefore results are only suggestive.
14It makes no (qualitative) di⁄erence whether the Home or the Foreign market is richer.
11varieties, both the quality gap and the price gap increase with ￿ and this augurs
well for surplus extraction. More importantly, the unit margin increases with ￿ and
the increase is larger the higher the quality level15. Clearly therefore, vertical seg-
mentation permits greater surplus extraction at the top as well as greater market
coverage16. Consequently, pro￿ts increase more with a› uence under vertically seg-
mented markets ￿hence the pro￿t di⁄erence increases with ￿: As before however,
LOP constrains top end surplus extraction more as the Foreign market gets richer
and this makes the pro￿t di⁄erence less convex.
3.3 Importance of the result, a quantitative assessment17
As we can see (￿gure 2), the pro￿t di⁄erence function is relatively ￿ at. This leads
us to raise the question: How much does exchange rate variability raise expected
pro￿ts relative to pro￿ts when the exchange rate is permanently ￿xed at unity? Is
this increase quantitatively important?18
We calculate the percentage increase in the pro￿t di⁄erence (gross of the ￿xed
cost, K) for chosen realizations of the exchange rate.19 We ￿nd a progressive e⁄ect
of exchange rate variability on percentage increase in pro￿ts. For variability within
0:05; 0:15 and 0:18 units from the mean, expected pro￿ts increase by as much as







=@￿ = ￿qi;￿ > 0; which is increasing in the quality level (P is given by
equation B2 in Appendix B).
16Although demand for the high quality variety falls when ￿ increases (because prices increase
with ￿), the displaced consumers turn to the low quality variety ￿ rather than exit the market.
With a single variety however, an increase in ￿ signi￿cantly lowers market coverage as all displaced
consumers have no option but to leave the market.
17We also examined the e⁄ects of relaxing the LOP assumption but since this is the focus of
Friberg (2001), we mention the results in passing (and refer the interested reader to Friberg, 2001).
Relaxing the LOP assumption con￿rms his result that: The expected bene￿t from (horizontally)
segmenting the Home and Foreign markets increases with exchange rate volatility. A consequence
of LOP is that the Home and Foreign prices are perfectly negatively correlated and this impacts
negatively on the ￿rm￿ s ability to extract surplus. Relaxing LOP allows the ￿rm to charge the
optimal price in each market. Since exchange rate volatility implies a divergence between the Home
and Foreign prices, relaxing LOP (segmenting the markets) is pro￿table.
18In Appendix C we provide an alternative way of assessing the quantitative signi￿cance of Propo-
sition 1. In particular, we ask the question: If the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between the single and the
two variety strategies in the absence of exchange rate volatility, what is the percentage increase in
K that would make the ￿rm to remain indi⁄erent when we allow for exchange rate volatility? We
reach a similar conclusion.
19Calculations are available from the author on request.
20The range of variability of the exchange rate suggested here is quite modest. For example, in
the period between years 2000 and 2006, the Rand (South African currency) to USD exchange rate
moved from over 12 Rands to the USD to below 6 Rands to the USD.
12These numbers are not huge, but they are also non-trivial. For example, if the
pro￿t di⁄erence under a "￿xed" exchange rate were ZAR 1 000 000, then a one
percent increase in expected pro￿ts (due to exchange rate variability) would mean
a ZAR 10 000 increase in expected pro￿ts.21 This is not insigni￿cant.
4 Conclusion
We extend the literature on monopoly product mix by considering how variability in
the exchange rate a⁄ects the variety range o⁄ered by a monopoly ￿rm selling at home
and abroad. We ￿nd that exchange rate variability induces the ￿rm to expand the
number of varieties produced. The mechanism works through the e⁄ect of exchange
rate volatility on the dispersion of income. A higher dispersion of income makes it
harder for the ￿rm to signi￿cantly extract surplus from the top end of the market
under a single variety strategy. Hence, variability in the exchange rate leads to more
varieties being o⁄ered. Our ￿nding is of great interest in light of the adoption of
the Euro. The result strengthens when we relax the "perfectly" integrated markets
assumption.
Our model has limitations. In the paper, we assumed perfectly ￿ exible prices.
However, the literature on pricing in international markets shows that pass-through
of exchange rate changes into import prices is generally incomplete. A notable
extension therefore would be to allow for price rigidity in the model. This, however,
is left for future research.
21ZAR is the acronym for the South African currency, the Rand.
13Appendix
Appendix A: Partial Market Coverage
Partial market coverage obtains whenever ￿ < P
q ; where P
q is the marginal willingness
to pay (MWTP) for quality of the individual indi⁄erent between purchasing a unit of
quality q at price P and purchasing nothing. Let ￿jk be the highest WTP consistent
with partial market coverage in market j when the ￿rm o⁄ers k varieties.








(3S+1)(2S￿1); where we make use of the fact that ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1:
In the two varieties case, market coverage is determined by the low quality va-
riety. In the Home market, the condition ￿ < P1H
q1 implies ￿H2 ￿
10(1+S)
9￿S and




10S2￿S￿1; where P1j is the price of quality 1 in market j;j = H;F:
In the Home market, ￿H1 ￿ ￿H2 = 8S+4S2+4
S2￿14S+45 > 0 for all S in the relevant
range: That is, the binding constraint is ￿H ￿ ￿H2: In the Foreign market, ￿F1 ￿
￿F2 = 4S+8S2+4S3
2S￿15S2￿16S3+60S4+1 > 0 for all S in the relevant range. Hence, the binding
constraint is ￿F ￿ ￿F2: Thus partial market coverage in the two varieties case
implies partial market coverage in the single variety case but not the other way










f1:6216g: In a sense, partial market coverage requires that markets be rather poor.
Appendix B: Derivation of Pro￿ts
Single variety strategy
Let ￿I be the pro￿t when the ￿rm sells a single variety in both markets. In the
second stage, the ￿rm chooses prices PH and PF, given quality q chosen in the ￿rst










s.t. PH = SPF: (B1)
where the demands (xH and xF) are given by equation (2).










Substituting (B2) into (B1) (assuming S = 1) gives ￿I as a function of q only.






(xH (P￿) + xF (P￿)). (B3)
Di⁄erentiating (B3) with respect to q and simplifying yields
q￿ = 2￿￿=3t(1 + ￿): (B4)
Substituting (B4) into (B2) gives
P￿









and substituting (B5) and (B4) into (B1) gives
￿￿









Let ￿II be the pro￿t when the ￿rm sells two varieties in each market. As before,
the ￿rm chooses quality based on the expected exchange rate and then after the
revelation of the exchange rate, choose prices. We solve the problem backwards. In
the second stage, given the qualities q1 and q2 chosen in stage 1, the ￿rm chooses
















xiF ￿ K s.t. PiH ￿ SPiF = 0:
(B7)
where the demands (xiH and xiF) are given by equation (3). Di⁄erentiating (B7)








=(2S￿ + 2) = SP￿
iF: (B8)
Substituting (B8) into (B7) (assuming S = 1) gives ￿II (q1;q2). In the ￿rst stage,











i ) + xiF (P￿
i )): (B9)






15Di⁄erentiating (B9) with respect to qi and simplifying yields
q￿
i = 2i￿￿=5t(1 + ￿);i = 1;2: (B10)
Substituting (B10) into (B8) gives
P￿









and substituting (B11) and (B10) into (B7) gives the pro￿t function under the








3 (1 + S￿)
￿ K : (B12)
Appendix C: Importance of the Result, a Quantitative Assessment
Although Proposition 1 is qualitatively quite intuitive, we still need to assess it￿ s
quantitative signi￿cance. The question we seek to answer is the following: Does
the ￿nding of Proposition 1 matter quantitatively? Our approach here ￿which is
an alternative to the approach in the text (subsection 3.3) ￿ is to calculate the
percentage increase in K that is required in order for the ￿rm to remain indi⁄erent
between the single and the two variety strategies if we allow for reasonable exchange













: In Proposition 1, we de￿ned K such
that, in the absence of exchange rate volatility (i.e., when the exchange rate is
permanently ￿xed at its mean value of unity), the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between the
single and the two variety strategies. Solving for K (assuming ￿ = 8
5;t = 0:5:) then
gives:
K￿ = 0:048545
That is, when the cost of vertically segmenting the markets is K￿; the ￿rm is
indi⁄erent between o⁄ering a single variety and o⁄ering two varieties.
Now let us allow for exchange rate variability. Suppose that for each draw of the
exchange rate there are two potential (symmetric) outcomes, S0 and S00; each with
equal probability and satisfying 1
2S0 + 1
2S00 = 1: Let (S0;S00) = (0:82;1:18): This is
a depreciation /appreciation of about 18%. This is fairly common in the currency
markets.
23This alternative approach was suggested to me by a referee.
















Substituting in the expressions and simplifying we get;
ES (￿I) = 0:59821
and
ES (￿II) = 0:64746 ￿ K:
The ￿rm will be indi⁄erent between the single and the two variety strategies
with an 18% depreciation/appreciation if and only if ES (￿II) = ES (￿I): Therefore
the value of K that makes the ￿rm indi⁄erent is:
e K = 0:64746 ￿ 0:59821 = 0:04925:
What is the percentage increase in K that would make the ￿rm indi⁄erent? This
is straight forward. We take the di⁄erence between e K and K￿ and divide it by K￿
and then multiply the resulting expression by 100. Thus:
%4K =
 









Thus for the ￿rm to be indi⁄erent between the single and two variety strategies
in the face of mild exchange rate volatility (18%), K would have to increase by
about 1.5%. This is not an insigni￿cant increase. Thus we conclude that the result
is quantitatively signi￿cant.
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